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Abstract
Regulating bank behavior throughout capital 
requirements has been a focal point of prudential 
regulation since the late 1980s. However, their 
beneficial effect on the banking sector’s safety 
and soundness was disputed ever since their ini-
tial implementation, mainly due to an assumption 
that they deteriorate bank profitability and incre-
ase the odds for the enlarged risk appetites of 
bank managers, especially in the highly compe-
titive financial markets. On the other hand, bank 
profitability is driven by many factors other than 
compliance with capital regulation. Concerning 
that, a question about the capital requirements’ 
impact on bank profitability was raised in this pa-
per. The dynamic panel data analysis served to 
examine the consequences of bank capital regula-
tion for the Croatian banking sector profitability, 
by taking into observation 24 commercial banks 
in the 2011-2016 timespan. The impact of capital 
regulation on the return on assets and net inte-
rest margin was positive, while for the return on 
equity a negative relationship was found. It was 
concluded that banks transfer regulatory costs on 
their clients, which was approximated with the 
net interest margin. In addition, results reveal 
that the overall bank profitability is achieved at 
the expense of bank shareholders. Thus, a more 
cost-efficient approach to managing a bank is 
suggested.
Keywords: capital requirements, bank pro-
fitability, capital structure, commercial banks, 
dynamic panel analysis
1. INTRODUCTION
Banking regulation is an integral part of 
every financial and economic system, aimed 
to direct banks’ shareholders, managers, and 
stakeholders towards a socially desirable be-
havior – the one that enables banks to perform 
various roles and provide diverse financial 
services which should respond to the public/
clients’ needs, without distracting the banking 
sector safety and soundness. However, imple-
mentation of regulatory instruments in prac-
tice is not cost-free and it imposes numerous 
limitations to the business of banking, which, 
in return, might cause unintended or even ad-
verse effects. In that sense, this paper puts in 
the spotlight the bank risk-weighted capital 
regulation i.e. its consequences for the bank 
managers’ behavior.
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The risk-weighted capital requirements 
regulation (also known under the umbrella 
term Basel accords) is the most important 
measure of regulating bank behavior since 
the late 1980s. The main idea behind its 
continuous use is that bank asset growth 
and risk acceptance will be permitted up 
to a certain level of regulatory capital, or, 
to be more precise, the capital adequacy 
ratio should not fall under 8%. Namely, 
the bank growth and business risks need to 
be backed up with an adequate level and 
structure of bank capital to avoid morally 
hazardous behavior by bank shareholders 
and their agents i.e. bank managers. More 
restrictive regulatory measures, like pro-
hibiting banks to offer certain high-risk fi-
nancial services, are not in line with the fi-
nancial liberalization ideology. Therefore, 
the capital requirements regulation will 
persist as the most important tool of pru-
dential authorities worldwide despite ex-
tensive criticism on its account (see e.g. 
Daníelsson et al., 2001; Rodríguez, 2003; 
Benston, 2007; Moosa, 2010). Among 
other shortcomings, one unintended ef-
fect of bank capital regulation has been re-
peated for a long time, or, to be more pre-
cise, since Koehn and Santomero, (1980), 
and Kim and Santomero (1988) seminal 
work. They maintained that the higher lev-
els of the most expensive source of financ-
ing, i.e. equity capital, will be compensated 
with larger business risk acceptance, which 
might destabilize, rather than (as expected) 
increase banking stability.
 Studies on the capital requirements 
implications, which were performed for 
the banking sectors of the most developed 
countries, mainly went into the direction of 
investigating their impact on the bank asset 
riskiness, selection of clients, and pro-cycli-
cality issues, leaving a rather modest empir-
ical background for the profitability aspect 
of the business of banking under capital 
requirements pressure. With regards to the 
latter, the majority of work was done in 
the area of testing the agency cost hypoth-
esis (e.g. Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 
2006), according to which more capitalized 
banks are less cost-efficient, and thus record 
lower profitability. Nevertheless, if higher 
equity financing affects bank profitability 
positively, this is attributed to a lower risk 
premium and decreased cost of refinancing 
in the case of better solvency (so-called tra-
ditional theory of capital structure). Finally, 
when the positive and negative effects of 
certain indebtedness levels are equal, the ef-
fect of the financial structure on profitabil-
ity is neutral. Examining the effects of the 
bank capital regulation has been a rather ne-
glected field of research when the Croatian 
banking sector is in focus, regardless of 
whether the microeconomic or macroeco-
nomic repercussions were under consid-
eration. Although there is certain empirical 
evidence about the capital regulation impact 
on bank profitability (see Kundid, 2012, 
2014) it is quite general and rather outdated. 
Therefore, with this paper, we strive to fill 
that gap and focus more on various aspects 
of bank regulatory solvency and their role 
in profitability achievement measured with 
the return on assets (as a proxy for bank 
managers’ performance accomplishment 
and the overall bank profitability), return on 
equity (stands for bank shareholders profit-
ability) and net interest margin (depicting 
the bank clients position). Furthermore, in-
spired by the work of Berger and Bouwman 
(2009), Osborne et al. (2012), de Bandt et 
al. (2017), Tabak et al. (2017), and de Bandt 
et al. (2018) our attention is focused on 
the time of low economic activity to reach 
some conclusions with regards to the ques-
tion whether higher regulatory capital can 
be a source of comparative advantage in the 
period of financial hardship. At last, with 
a stronghold in Coccorese and Girardone 
(2017), we explain whether the capital 
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requirements influence on the bank profit-
ability is rooted in the credit risk channel, 
off-balance-sheet channel, and/or operating 
efficiency channel of the capital regulation.
The rest of the paper is organized as 
follows: the second section focuses mainly 
on the theory of capital structure, which 
is a cornerstone of studies about the risk-
weighted capital regulation impact on bank 
behavior. The third section summarizes 
empirical literature concerning the capital 
regulation consequences for the banking 
sector’s profitability. The fourth section 
discloses the empirical strategy, followed 
by the discussion of research results on the 
capital regulation relevance for explain-
ing the disparities in the Croatian banks’ 
profitability. The last section points out the 





RESEARCH OF THE BANK
CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS
REGULATION
“Any economic study of bank capital regu-
lation requires a theory of capital struc-
ture” (Prescott, 2001, 35). 
The contemporary theory of capital 
structure is a complex field of research, that 
has been developing since the late 1950s. 
Despite numerous explanations concern-
ing the capital structure relevance for the 
business performance, it all comes down to 
these milestones in the theory development: 
the capital structure irrelevance theory 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1958), traditional 
approach to capital structure (Myers, 1984), 
underinvestment hypothesis, risk-shifting 
hypothesis and pecking order theory of 
capital structure (Myers, 1984; Myers and 
Majluf, 1984).
According to Modigliani and Miller 
(1958), there is no optimal capital structure, 
as companies’ financial decisions do not in-
fluence their market value. Namely, when 
perfect market conditions are assumed, the 
weighted average cost of capital remains 
unchanged in the case of capital restructur-
ing as any increase in the cheaper financial 
sources like debt financing will be annulled 
with a more expensive subordinated debt 
and equity financing due to an increased fi-
nancial risk premium. Even though perfect 
market conditions are a utopian phenom-
enon, Modigliani and Miller’s irrelevance 
proposition is valuable, as they focus more 
on the importance of the company’s in-
vestment quality, rather than on financial 
contracts, which should be seen as transi-
tional assets or investment offers to poten-
tial investors. Thus, three decades after his 
seminal paper, Miller (1988, 100) empha-
sized: “the view that capital structure is 
literally irrelevant or that ‘nothing matters’ 
in corporate finance, though still some-
times attributed to us, is far from what we 
ever actually said about the real-world ap-
plications of our theoretical propositions”, 
but “showing what doesn’t matter can also 
show, by implication, what does”. What 
matters even more nowadays, since the end 
of one of the most severe and expensive 
financial crisis, are certainly the main les-
sons of Modigliani and Miller’s theorem 
that there is no alchemy of finance and that 
without real assets it is not possible to cre-
ate new value and enlarge the capital. With 
their capital structure irrelevance hypoth-
esis, they accentuated the importance of 
the meaningful usage of capital and threats 
from a belief in financial illusions. 
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Contrary to the aforementioned, the tra-
ditional approach to capital structure, which 
is also known as the static trade-off theory, 
advocates the existence of an optimal capi-
tal structure i.e. the one that maximizes the 
market value of a company (Myers, 1984). 
Namely, up to a certain level, debt financ-
ing is welcomed, as positive effects of the 
tax shield, in case of recording profit, over-
ride negative effects of financial risk pre-
mium increase i.e. higher refinancing costs. 
The market value of a company is maxi-
mized to the point at which the net effect 
between positive and negative implications 
of a certain financial leverage usage is zero. 
Beyond that point, further debt financing in-
creases the chance for company bankruptcy 
as well as refinancing risk, finally enlarg-
ing the weighted average cost of capital so 
that it diminishes a tax shield benefits if 
there is still some profit volume. Thus, the 
key implications of this theory for the busi-
ness practice could be summarized in the 
following way: 1) there should be more ac-
tive planning of capital structure, 2) costs 
and benefits of certain financing source 
should be taken into observation, and, fi-
nally, 3) going into debt should be moder-
ate and prudent. In addition, companies 
with more stable cash flows will be able to 
bear higher indebtedness levels than riskier 
companies, ceteris paribus (Ryen et al., 
1997, 42). Nevertheless, it might be difficult 
or even impossible to achieve an optimal 
capital structure at any point in time, due 
to required time and costs for adjustment as 
well as other objective limitations. In such a 
manner, Flannery and Rangan (2006) found 
that, in the 1965-2001 period, the US non-
financial companies failed to bridge the 
gap between the current and target capital 
structure by closing merely 1/3 of the gap 
in every observed year. Similarly, Berger et 
al. (2008) concluded that the large listed US 
bank holdings managed to close between 
45% to 57% of the capital structure gap in 
the 1992-2006 period. Furthermore, the tra-
ditional approach to capital structure does 
not explain why companies with an increas-
ing market value undertake equity, instead 
of debt financing. According to this theory, 
debt financing would move those compa-
nies closer to the optimal capital structure. 
The described case and similar inconsist-
encies of the static trade-off theory with a 
business practice were explained with the 
pecking order theory (Myers, 1984; Myers 
and Majluf, 1984). The pecking order the-
ory is all about the hierarchy of financing 
sources, which is set and followed by man-
agers to choose the least “painful” option at 
a certain moment, to be more precise, the 
one which causes the least resistance and 
the lowest level of market discipline. Thus, 
rather than having a target capital struc-
ture, there is a preferred order of financing 
in a company according to which internal 
sources have priority over external sourc-
es, debt is preferred over equity financing, 
whereas the dividend policy should be sta-
ble. Equity financing is advisable when 
company stocks are overvalued and busi-
ness outcomes are expected to deteriorate. 
On the contrary, debt financing is preferred 
in case of market undervaluation and when 
strong business results are being anticipat-
ed. In such circumstances, the agency prob-
lem or the conflict of interests between the 
company’s shareholders and managers is 
avoided. Later on, the original pecking or-
der theory was modified with conclusions, 
derived from the corporate financial prac-
tice according to which there is an aver-
sion towards both debt and equity financing 
(Myers, 1984). The risk of equity offering 
failures makes this source of financing the 
“last resort” for company managers, while 
heavy reliance on debt financing is also 
unwelcomed to sustain a desirable level of 
credit capacity and minimize the financial 
disorder threat. This is why some new ex-
planations were introduced dealing more 
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with the information asymmetries in fi-
nancial decision-making as well as with 
agency problems between shareholders and 
debtholders and between shareholders and 
managers, 
Agency problem appears whenever a 
certain level of cooperation is required for 
some goal achievement or when there is a 
necessity for activities such as risk-sharing 
and monitoring (Eisenhardt, 1989, 58-59). 
It implies a conflict of interests and initia-
tives between various parties in the process. 
Under-investment hypothesis and risk-shift-
ing hypothesis are the two most common 
forms of agency problems between com-
pany owners and creditors and they are of 
crucial importance for the capital structure 
discussion. Under-investing or missing the 
profitable investments on purpose usually 
occurs if there is a poor level of equity fi-
nancing of a company, as company share-
holders or managers refuse to increase the 
equity financing of the company to prevent 
a potential sizeable transfer of financial re-
sults to company creditors (Frydenberg, 
2004, 17-18). Moreover, managers of high-
ly indebted companies, which are, thus, 
closer to bankruptcy, might minimize their 
efforts in launching and monitoring pro-
jects, as their position is less stable (Ryen 
et al., 1997, 43). Inversely, according to the 
risk-shifting or asset-substitution hypoth-
esis, a high indebtedness level might in-
crease the odds for the adoption of a riskier 
business strategy, as potential losses will be 
incurred mainly by the company debthold-
ers, while potential profit will be distributed 
among its shareholders. Excessive divi-
dends payout and additional financing with 
senior debt instruments are alternative ways 
of how company owners might achieve 
certain benefits, at the expense of creditors 
(Orgler and Taggart, 1981, 19; Frydenberg, 
2004, 17). Along with agency issues in 
shareholders – debtholders relation, there is 
a conflict of interest between the company’s 
shareholders and managers. Concerning 
that, Berger et al. (1995, 399) conclude that 
on the lower level of equity financing there 
is an agency problem between company’s 
shareholders and debtholders, while on the 
higher level of equity financing, agency 
problem between owners and creditors is 
diminishing, but the conflict of interests 
between owners and managers is growing. 
Excessive consumption and avoidance of 
going into debt due to the pressure of re-
payment that might result from it, are the 
two typical modes of managerial behav-
ior which is more oriented towards build-
ing up managers’ wealth and power, rather 
than towards adding value to the company 
and its shareholders (Ryen et al., 1997, 44). 
The aforementioned agency problem is well 
known in the literature as the agency costs 
hypothesis. According to the latter, higher 
indebtedness of company (due to the re-
payment obligation) reduces the manag-
ers’ overall cost inefficiency (Berger and 
Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006), as well as waste-
fulness of financial sources, hubris, and op-
portunistic behavior, which might appear if 
there is a significant free cash flow (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). The importance of the 
agency theory for solving the capital struc-
ture issues in the business of banking was 
acknowledged with the development of the 
moral hazard theory and the capital buffer 
theory. The aforementioned was the most 
convincing confirmation that the theory of 
capital structure, which originally emerged 
in the area of non-financial enterprises, is 
also applicable for the banking services 
industry, despite its numerous specifici-
ties and extensive regulatory requirements, 
oversight, and protection (i.e. via the depos-
it insurance system, the lender of last resort 
and other safety net elements). 
According to the moral hazard theory 
(Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Kim and 
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Santomero, 1988; Gennotte and Pyle, 1991; 
Rochet, 1992; Blum, 1999), bank manag-
ers will endeavor to keep the bank capi-
tal at the required regulatory minimum, 
which is in line with the pecking order 
theory about equity financing as the last re-
sort. Furthermore, due to a safety net pres-
ence (especially via the deposit insurance 
system), the market discipline of banks is 
rather modest (e.g. Hellmann et al., 2000), 
which directs bank managers to exploit the 
benefits of the financial leverage increase 
without any significant enlargement of the 
cost of capital. Thus, if regulators would 
request a bank capital build-up, based on 
the moral hazard theory conclusions, con-
sequently higher costs of financing will be 
compensated with the asset riskiness eleva-
tion. Concerning that, on the data sample of 
6,800 banks from the 13 OECD countries 
in the 1993-2007 period, King (2010) esti-
mated an increase in the interest rate spread 
for 15 basis points, if an increase in the de-
manded regulatory capital ratio for 1% en-
larges the cost of bank capital, ceteris pari-
bus. Afterward, many appraisals confirmed 
prior conclusions about the positive impact 
of higher capital requirements on the cost 
of bank credit. However, estimations var-
ied from merely 2 basis points to 80 basis 
points of an increase in the lending rates 
due to a more restrictive capital regulation 
(according to a compilation of studies by 
Cohen and Scatigna, 2014 and Dagher et 
al., 2016). 
Thus, according to the moral hazard the-
ory, any attempt by prudential authorities to 
demand additional capital will be dismissed 
as a counterproductive measure. Namely, 
if bank shareholders/managers would in-
sist on scoring the earlier return on equity 
(or even increasing it), the possible ways to 
achieve that goal in the presence of capital 
regulation pressures are 1) to reduce oper-
ating costs (throughout economies of scale, 
economies of scope, x-efficiency, econo-
mies of synergy or more favorable debt 
financing), or/and 2) to increase the asset 
riskiness. However, the business practice 
revealed quite a different behavioral pat-
tern than minimal compliance of banks with 
the capital requirements regulation. For in-
stance, Berger et al. (2008) found out that 
even large or too-big-to-fail banks, which 
were listed on the US stock exchanges 
over the 1992-2006 period, maintained the 
bank capital levels significantly above the 
regulatory required minimum, and not as 
a consequence of the passive approach to 
bank capital management (i.e. by retaining 
earnings), but the active approach or eq-
uity offerings. Similarly, Gropp and Heider 
(2009) concluded that large and profitable 
banks in the US and the EU-15 in the peri-
od from 1991-2004, have sizeable surpluses 
of capital when compared to the regulatory 
requests although those banks could carry 
out equity issuance promptly and effort-
lessly if needed. On the other hand, Ashraf 
et al. (2016) disclosed global evidence (by 
observing 8700 banks from 58 countries in 
the period 1998-2007) concerning the posi-
tive impact of capital requirements on bank 
retained earnings. However, the effect of 
capital regulation on bank dividend pay-
ments limitation to meet the minimum reg-
ulatory capital requests was rather modest 
in the financial crisis period. Furthermore, 
the PriceWaterHouseCoopers (2004, 64) 
revealed results that even before a more re-
strictive capital regulation imposed by the 
Basel II accord, the average bank regulatory 
capital level in the EU-15 in the year 2002 
was 3,8 percentage points higher than the 
regulatory required one (8%). According 
to Berger and Bouwman (2009), a higher 
bank capital level might be of essential im-
portance in times of financial crises, as they 
demonstrated that it increases the likelihood 
for bank survival and might be a source 
of its comparative advantage in retaining 
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existing bank clients and attracting new 
ones. In addition, higher bank capitalization 
might improve bank profitability in a crisis 
period, following the evidence by Osborne 
et al. (2012) for the US banks. These are 
the reasons why the capital buffer theory 
or the precautionary regulatory capital the-
ory (Marcus, 1984; Calem and Rob, 1999; 
Milne and Whalley, 2001; Milne, 2002) 
came under the spotlight. Contrary to the 
moral hazard theory, the capital buffer the-
ory upholds the view about the prudent and 
cautious behavior of bank managers under 
the regulatory pressures as they endeavor to 
keep the surplus of capital above the mini-
mally prescribed levels (i.e. have capital 
buffers or voluntary capital) and cherish 
such asset risk management policies which 
will not increase the odds for a bank failure.
To sum up, the debt financing has an 
advantage of the tax shield usage; it adds 
to management cost efficiency and is per-
ceived to signal better company prosper-
ity than equity financing, but it certainly 
increases the costs of financial distress and 
the likelihood of bankruptcy as well as the 
preferred risk level of shareholders (Wall 
and Peterson, 1998, 8). Furthermore, in 
the business of banking the issue of capital 
structure comes down to the point of the 
bank capital level, which is important as it 
impacts at least three areas (Diamond and 
Rajan, 2000):
1. liquidity creation and bank refinancing
opportunities,
2. credit origination, the cost of capi-
tal and, consequently, the selection of
bank clients, and finally,
3. bank safety and soundness as it pro-
tects the bank from unexpected losses
and business shocks.
It will consequently influence the bank 
profitability. With that in mind, we seek 
to answer a question regarding the capital 
regulation effect on various bank profitabil-
ity indicators which will capture repercus-
sions of certain bank capital structure under 
capital requirements pressure for the overall 
bank profitability, as well as its sharehold-
ers and clients.
3. CAPITAL REGULATION AS A 
KEY DRIVER OF BANKING
INDUSTRY PROFITABILITY:
A REVIEW OF THE
EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND
In-depth analyses of the capital require-
ments influence on bank profitability are 
scarce in comparison to the sizeable body 
of literature on the determinants of bank 
profitability, especially when bank profit-
ability is approximated with indicators, 
other than the return on assets. Thus, we 
review the articles which were the most im-
portant for our study, whereas the empirical 
background on the determinants of bank 
profitability is beyond the scope of this 
paper.
Naceur and Kandil (2009) took into ob-
servation 28 banks from Egypt in the period 
from 1989-2004 and confirmed a positive 
impact of equity to assets ratio on the return 
on assets (ROA) and net interest margin 
(NIM), while no impact of bank capital-
ization on the return on equity (ROE) was 
found. Thus, it was concluded that higher 
capital requirements through lower expect-
ed bankruptcy costs and consequently lower 
financing costs add to bank profitability ap-
proximated with ROA. However, higher 
costs of equity financing are transferred to 
bank clients, as the impact of capital regu-
lation on the cost of banking intermediation 
(NIM) is positive. Finally, the insignifi-
cant influence of the financial structure on 
ROE is explainable by the zero net effect 
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between higher costs of equity financing 
and higher NIM. The aforementioned con-
clusions are valid only in the short run, 
while in the long run, the effects of capital 
requirements on bank profitability indica-
tors tend to perish. In such a manner, de 
Bandt et al. (2018) pointed out the manda-
tory capital requirements insignificance 
for the bank ROA, when 25 French banks 
were taken into consideration in the pe-
riod 2007-2014. However, the voluntary 
capital that banks held affected their profit-
ability positively. On the other hand, some 
earlier results that covered 17 French bank-
ing groups in the period from 1993-2012 
documented a positive impact of an above-
average increase in bank capital require-
ments to bank ROA and ROE (de Bandt et 
al., 2017). Next, Fungáčová and Poghosyan 
(2011) revealed the results for the Russian 
banking sector from 1999 to 2007 accord-
ing to which, regardless of the owner-
ship type, the equity to assets ratio adds to 
NIM. The same conclusion holds for the 
bank data sample from the European Union 
members and candidate countries, but only 
for the 1995-2000 period, which is charac-
terized by the banking sector consolidation 
(Kasman et al., 2010). Namely, in the post-
consolidation period i.e. from 2001-2006, 
due to increased competition, mainly the 
low capitalized banks entered higher risks 
which consequently raised their NIMs and 
the overall impact of equity to assets ratio 
on NIM was a negative one. On the other 
hand, based on the data for the Estonian 
banks in the period 1999-2011, Männasoo 
(2013) concluded that there is a positive im-
pact of the capital adequacy ratio on interest 
margin.
Coccorese and Girardone (2017) docu-
mented a positive effect of capital require-
ments on ROA on the data sample com-
posed of 4 414 banks worldwide in the 
period from 2000-2013 and explained that 
higher profitability of better-capitalized 
banks is driven by their increased credit 
risk capacity, larger off-balance-sheet ac-
tivities and more efficient cost management. 
Improved cost efficiency was also attributed 
to higher capital requirements of Chinese 
banks in domestic ownership in the period 
2004-2009 (Pessarossi and Weill, 2015). 
Furthermore, Bitar et al. (2016) ana-
lyzed the data set for 168 banks from the 
Middle East and North Africa region for 
the 1999-2013 time span. Again, a posi-
tive influence of regulatory capital on 
bank profitability was recorded. In addi-
tion, the authors emphasize the importance 
of a developed institutional framework for 
the bank risk management strategies, as in 
such countries, too-big-to-fail banks react 
to higher capital requirements by improv-
ing their risk management process and 
downsizing the credit risk, which conse-
quently downsizes the agency costs and 
enlarges bank profitability. On the other 
hand, Boubakri et al. (2017) confirmed that 
even when national culture is taken into 
consideration, the bank equity to assets ra-
tio drives ROE in a negative, and NIM in 
a positive way. However, in the banking 
crisis period, higher equity financing might 
enlarge ROE, regardless of the bank size, 
as was detected by Berger and Bouwman 
(2009) for more than 18 300 US banks in 
the period from 1984-2008.
According to the results of the cross-
country study of 4555 banks in 51 countries 
in the period from 2000-2012, which were 
obtained by Tabak et al. (2017), the initial 
capitalization level is an important fac-
tor that drives bank profitability, measured 
with ROA, either positively or negatively. 
Namely, on a low capitalization level, capi-
tal buffers contribute to profitability build-
up as they boost bank credit capacity, re-
duce costs of financing and make banks less 
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vulnerable to credit contraction in the eco-
nomic downturn. On the other hand, in the 
case of sizeable capital buffers, profitability 
is declining, as holding too much capital is 
inefficient. The latter was earlier confirmed 
by Osborne et al. (2012) who analyzed the 
data sample of US banks in the period from 
the late 1970s to the year 2010 and found 
that with an exemption of the crisis period, 
sizeable capital buffers decrease ROA.
To sum up, the mixed results of empiri-
cal studies concerning the impact of capital 
requirements on various bank profitability 
indicators, make it a rather important topic 
on the research agenda in the area of capi-
tal regulation and, consequently, banking 
stability.
4. RESOLVING THE CAPITAL 
REGULATION AND BANK 
PROFITABILITY PUZZLE 
FOR CROATIA IN TIMES OF 
LOW ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
4.1. Data, methodology, and model 
development
The empirical analysis of the capital 
regulation contribution to bank profitability 
was carried out on the data sample which 
was composed of 24 commercial banks 
from the Croatian banking sector in the pe-
riod from 2011-2016. Only the banks which 
were operating continuously during the ob-
served period were taken into consideration, 
while due to modest financial reporting (un-
availability of online financial reports for a 
certain year) some of them were excluded 
from further investigation. Namely, based 
on financial reports which were disclosed 
by the sample banks on their official web-
sites, we calculated financial indicators and 
other model variables. Attention was fo-
cused on a period of low overall economic 
activity (as in, e.g. Berger and Bouwman, 
2009; Osborne et al., 2012; de Bandt et al., 
2017; Tabak et al., 2017; de Bandt et al., 
2018) to provide an assessment of the regu-
latory capital importance in times of poor 
credit growth and scarce profit opportuni-
ties. In such a manner, a conclusion about 
the importance of risk-weighted capital re-
quirements for the bank’s business perfor-
mance, and consequently banking stabil-
ity could be reached. Dynamic panel data 
methodology was suitable to solve this 
research problem empirically, to be more 
precise Blundell-Bond estimator was em-
ployed, due to a small number of periods (6 
years) and groups (24 banks) characterizing 
the data sample, and rather high persistency 
of model variables. 
The dependent variable – bank profit-
ability, was measured with the return on 
assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and 
net interest margin (NIM). Capital regu-
lation (bank solvency) was encompassed 
with the following financial indicators: 
1) equity to assets ratio (CAP), 2) capi-
tal adequacy ratio (ADEQ), 3) tier 1 ratio 
(TIER1ADEQ), and 4) capital quality ratio 
(CAPQUAL). The list of control variables 
involved the asset liquidity ratio (LIQ), as-
set quality ratio (NPL), asset riskiness ratio 
(RWA), operating efficiency ratio (OPEFF), 
off-balance sheet variable (OBS), and one 
macroeconomic variable – real annual gross 
domestic product growth rate (GDPG). The 
list of independent variables is listed in 
Table 1.
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Table 1. Independent variables
Variable Definition Group of variables
CAP Equity / Total assets Capital structure indicator
ADEQ Capital adequacy ratio = Regulatory capital / Risk-weighted assets Regulatory capital ratio
TIER1ADEQ Tier 1 ratio = Core equity capital / Risk weighted assets Regulatory capital ratio
CAPQUAL Capital quality ratio = Core equity capital / Total assets Regulatory capital ratio
LIQ Liquid assets / Total assets Liquidity indicator – asset liquidity indicator
OPEFF Operating efficiency indicator = Overheads / Total assets
Indicator of cost management
efficiency
NPL Non-performing loans / Total loans Asset quality indicator
RWA Risk-weighted assets / Total assets Asset riskiness indicator
OBS Ln (volume of derivatives) Off-balance sheet indicator
GDPG Real GDP growth rate (annual rate) Macroeconomic indicator
Source: Authors.
Bearing in mind various profitability (PROF = ROA, ROE, NIM) and solvency (SOLV 
= CAP, ADEQ, TIER1ADEQ, CAPQUAL) indicators, which were used to calculate the po-
tential pressure which capital requirements regulation puts on bank management and con-
sequently on its profitability, we performed a comprehensive evaluation of the following 
baseline model:
where i denotes an individual and t denotes time, μ is an intercept, γ is a parameter of the 
lagged dependent variable, β1, β2, …, βK are the parameters of the exogenous variables, αi is 
an individual-specific effect and εit are the error terms.
We assume a positive impact of solven-
cy indicators on the ROA and NIM while 
expecting the negative one on the ROE 
to confirm the presumption that the risk-
weighted bank capital regulation affects 
bank shareholders (whose interests are ap-
proximated with the ROE) and stakehold-
ers (whose interests are approximated with 
the ROA for bank managers and NIM for 
bank clients) differently. Namely, a higher 
solvency level enables a better pledge 
against the bank risks and allows further 
sustainable bank asset growth, and thus 
higher overall bank profitability measured 
via ROA is backed up with the lower finan-
cial risks and more prudent asset growth 
and risk management. In the nutshell, we 
adopt the conclusions of the capital buffer 
theory. Regarding ROE, we admit the en-
dogeneity issue between various solvency 
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indicators and ROE due to equity being a 
part of the ROE formula, as well as equity 
is composed of retained and current profit/
loss. Therefore, higher solvency might re-
duce the ROE, solely because of the ROE 
formula. However, if this methodological 
problem is successfully solved, a nega-
tive impact of higher bank solvency on the 
shareholders’ profitability might reflect the 
case of both financial and business risks 
being downsized, which is again in line 
with the capital buffer theory. Finally, an 
increase in the bank solvency level might 
increase bank shareholders’ profit requests, 
which could be achieved throughout a high-
er NIM level (see e.g. Naceur and Kandil, 
2009) i.e. simultaneous interest income in-
crease and interest expenses decrease, or 
solely through reducing the costs of financ-
ing as a consequence of lower financial 
risks of uninsured bank debtholders in case 
of higher bank capitalization (Berger and 
Mester, 1997). In line with that, capital re-
quirements regulation might affect mostly 
bank clients, as all the direct regulatory 
costs are likely to be transferred to them, 
either throughout higher interest income, 
i.e. more expensive loans (as a consequence 
of higher proportion of expensive equity 
financing in the bank capital structure), 
and/or on the other hand insufficient loan 
approval. 
Control variables were selected by fol-
lowing the standard empirical body of 
knowledge on the determinants of bank 
profitability, data availability criteria, as 
well as model limitations considering the 
number of explanatory variables. Asset li-
quidity (LIQ) is expected to be inversely 
related to bank profitability measured with 
ROA and ROE as lower yields are col-
lected on more liquid assets. Concerning 
NIM, higher LIQ might increase it as bank 
managers could try to compensate for lower 
asset profitability by increasing the NIM. 
Operating inefficiency (OPEFF) should 
lower ROA and ROE, while it might in-
crease NIM. Namely, according to Dumičić 
and Ridzak (2013) lower operating efficien-
cy could be compensated with the higher 
cost of banking intermediation (NIM) i.e. 
by transferring the burden of poor operating 
efficiency on bank clients through higher 
interest rates on loans, and lower inter-
est rates on deposits. Similarly, lower asset 
quality (NPL) is expected to reduce ROA 
and ROE, which will endeavor to be com-
pensated with higher risk premiums, which 
will consequently produce higher NIM 
(Diko, 2019). Furthermore, up to a certain 
level as well as up point in time, higher 
asset riskiness (RWA) will increase bank 
profitability (ROA and ROE) as riskier as-
sets, primarily loans, bear higher interest in-
come which increases the NIM (Witowschi 
and Luca, 2016). In addition, the higher the 
off-balance-sheet activities by banks, the 
higher ROA and ROE are expected, while 
the impact on NIM should be negative due 
to a trade-off between non-interest activities 
and traditional lending ones i.e. due to the 
diversification of bank income sources (Le, 
2017). Finally, a more favorable macroeco-
nomic surrounding (approximated with the 
GDPG indicator) should alter bank profit-
ability, mainly due to a greater demand for 
loans (e.g. Witowschi and Luca, 2016).
4.2.  Research results
The empirical results of the estimated 
panel models with ROA, ROE, and NIM as 
profitability indicators are given in Tables 
2-4. Solvency indicators were interchange-
ably employed in the models, due to a 
strong correlation between each of them. 
Furthermore, lagged values of solvency 
variables in panel models, with ROE as the 
dependent variable, were used to solve a 
reverse causality problem. Namely, due to 
a small number of groups, those variables 
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could not be treated as endogenous ones. 
To sum up, we calculated the results for 12 
panel data models in total. All calculations 
were made in statistical package STATA/
S.E. 13.1, as well as correlation matrix and 
descriptive statistics which are not append-
ed to the article, due to its size restrictions, 
but are available upon request.
Firstly, econometric results confirm a 
certain profit persistency in the Croatian 
banking sector, regardless of the profitabil-
ity indicator which was employed as the es-
timated parameters of the lagged dependent 
variables were always positive. However, 
when ROA and ROE were dependent varia-
bles, persistency was lower than in the NIM 
case. Namely, estimated coefficients in the 
ROA and ROE cases were not higher than 
0.25, while in the case of NIM they were 
almost 0.5. This indicates that banks’ net 
interest margin is heavily dependable upon 
the achieved net interest margins in the 
previous year i.e. that the speed of adjust-
ment of NIM to the banking sector trends 
is rather small, despite the fairly competi-
tive Croatian banking industry when ROA 
and ROE coefficients value are taken into 
consideration.
Secondly, a positive impact of higher 
solvency on the ROA and NIM was detect-
ed, which is in line with the capital buffer 
theory and our assumption. This means that 
higher solvency adds to overall bank profit-
ability throughout its positive impact on the 
NIM i.e. simultaneous increase in the inter-
est income (due to enlarged growth oppor-
tunities and business risks), and decrease in 
the interest expenses or solely reduction in 
the interest expenses due to lower financial 
risks. The opposite conclusions are reached 
if bank solvency and profitability are simul-
taneously decreasing. To be more precise, if 
bank solvency is decreasing, financial risks 
and interest expenses are increasing, which, 
in turn, downsizes NIM and, consequently, 
ROA, which is simultaneously affected by 
higher growth restrictions. In addition to 
that, higher solvency reduces shareholders’ 
profitability measured with the ROE, which 
might turn them towards riskier asset se-
lection followed by higher interest income 
and later on higher ROA. Thus, our results 
confirm that the capital requirements regu-
lation impairs shareholders’ profitability 
(ROE) and directs bank managers towards 
seeking more profitable (riskier) assets and/
or transferring the regulatory costs on bank 
clients (NIM) to preserve the overall bank 
profitability (ROA). Obtained results were 
consistent regardless of the type of solven-
cy indicator being employed to depict capi-
tal requirements regulation. They are also 
comparable to the findings of the majority 
of studies reviewed in the previous section. 
Thus, having larger equity financing and 
capital requirements might be beneficial 
for bank profitability, especially in times 
of poor macroeconomic performance when 
bank financial results are weak and busi-
ness risks enlarged, while, at the same time, 
larger regulatory pressures being imposed 
on banks to preserve banking sector stabil-
ity. In such circumstances, having sufficient 
surplus in bank regulatory capital makes 
a difference between banks that success-
fully cope with the crisis and those which 
struggle for their existence, due to lower 
financial, and, consequently, business risks 
as well as more relaxed position regarding 
the additional regulatory burden of the first 
ones.
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Table 2. Panel data estimations of the baseline model with ROA as a dependent variable



















































































 Number of observations 119 119 119 119
 Number of banks 24 24 24  24
Sargan test (p – value) 0,2517 0,4122 0,4070  0,2898
First-order autocorrelation
(p – value) 0,2380 0,2652 0,2310  0,2340
Second-order autocorrelation
(p – value) 0,7616 0,6073 0,2004  0,1655
*** Statistically significant at 1% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level, * Statistically significant 
at 10% level. 
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Most of the other empirical results were 
in line with the expectations. Thus, a higher 
operating efficiency indicator (OPEFF) has 
a positive impact on bank NIM, and nega-
tive on bank ROA, which means that banks 
operating inefficiency is achieved at the 
expense of bank clients i.e. it enlarges the 
cost of banking intermediation (NIM), but 
still insufficiently to sustain overall bank 
profitability (ROA). Similarly, an increase 
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of the non-performing loans (NPL) reduces 
the banks’ ROA and ROE, which is logi-
cal, when the income statement structure 
is in mind as well the NPLs’ effect on the 
asset shrinkage. Contrary to that, NPLs are 
followed by the NIM increase, due to as-
set shrinkage as well as due to endeavors 
to compensate lower profitability with a 
net interest income increase. Furthermore, 
a positive linkage between asset riskiness 
(RWA) and profitability (ROA and ROE) 
is recorded as well as a favorable impact 
of GDP growth on the NIM (and partly 
ROE). Finally, only for LIQ and OBS, we 
obtained somewhat unexpected results. 
Thus, having more liquid assets (LIQ) turns 
out to increase the banks’ ROA and ROE 
and to decrease their NIM, while higher 
off-balance-sheet activity (OBS) decreases 
the banks’ ROA and ROE. The latter might 
indicate insufficient knowledge and experi-
ence of bank managers when using financial 
derivatives which are the cornerstone of 
the off-balance sheet business or the unfa-
vorable derivatives market conditions. On 
the other hand, a positive impact of bank 
liquidity on ROA and ROE, and a negative 
impact on NIM might be explained with the 
practice of charging off the loans which are 
unlikely to be collected, better complying 
with the more restrictive liquidity require-
ments, and/or signal a slowdown in credit 
growth on a certain market. In that case, 
lower NIM would be compensated with the 
higher non-interest income activity to in-
crease the overall bank profitability.
Table 3. Panel data estimations of the baseline model with ROE as a dependent variable
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Number of observations 115 115 115 115
Number of banks 24 24 24 24
Sargan test (p – value) 0,6436 0,2905 0,6154 0,5304
First-order autocorrelation
(p – value) 0,1138 0,0633 0,0921 0,1183
Second-order autocorrelation
(p – value) 0,1650 0,0911 0,1480 0,2131
*** Statistically significant at 1% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level, * Statistically significant 
at 10% level. 
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Table 4. Panel data estimations of the baseline model with NIM as a dependent variable






















































































Number of observations 119 119 119 119
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Number of banks 24 24 24 24
Sargan test (p – value) 0,3085 0,3082 0,2630 0,3230
First-order autocorrelation 
(p – value) 0,0139 0,0147 0,0167 0,0123
Second-order autocorrelation 
(p – value) 0,4079 0,3426 0,3716 0,3847
*** Statistically significant at 1% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level, * Statistically significant 
at 10% level. 
Source: Authors’ calculation.
To support some of our assumptions as 
well as conclusions on the capital regula-
tion impact on bank profitability, we have 
tested several channels throughout which 
bank capital requirements regulation might 
alter bank profitability. To be more pre-
cise, with a stronghold in Coccorese and 
Girardone (2017) we have tested the cred-
it risk channel, off-balance-sheet chan-
nel, and operating efficiency channel of 
the capital regulation on bank profitabil-
ity. Interaction variables between cred-
it risk and capital regulation (RWACAP, 
RWAADEQ, RWATIER1ADEQ, and 
RWACAPQUAL), off-balance-sheet ac-
tivity and capital regulation (OBSCAP, 
OBSADEQ, OBSTIER1ADEQ, and 
OBSCAPQUAL), and operating efficien-
cy and capital regulation (OPEFFCAP, 
OPEFFADEQ, OPEFFTIER1ADEQ, and 
OPEFFCAPQUAL) were constructed and 
introduced in the baseline models with 
ROA, ROE, and NIM as dependent vari-
ables. As expected, we excluded solvency 
variables (CAP, ADEQ, TIER1ADEQ, and 
CAPQUAL) from the models as those vari-
ables are now encompassed with the inter-
action variables. With the similar argumen-
tation of resolving the collinearity problem, 
we excluded RWA, OBS, and OPEFF from 
the models in which we particularly tested 
credit risk channel, off-balance-sheet chan-
nel, and operating efficiency channel of the 
capital regulation. The empirical results 
of the estimated panel models with ROA, 
ROE, and NIM as profitability indicators 
and credit risk, off-balance-sheet, and oper-
ating efficiency channels effects of the capi-
tal regulation are disclosed in the appendix.
Following the aforementioned results, 
it can be concluded that the capital require-
ments regulation adds to banks return on as-
sets throughout credit risk channel, off-bal-
ance-sheet channel, and operating efficiency 
channel, which means that higher levels of 
bank solvency increase its risk-weighted 
assets, off-balance-sheet activities, and op-
erating inefficiency, which consequently 
results in higher ROA. Regarding the NIM 
models, there lacks solid empirical evidence 
of the off-balance sheet channel of capital 
regulation, but there is proof of the positive 
impact of capital regulation throughout the 
credit risk channel and operating efficiency 
channel on the bank net interest margin. To 
be more precise, when a bank’s regulatory 
capital increases, a riskier asset choice as 
well as increased operating inefficiency will 
add to the bank’s net interest margin, prob-
ably due to interest income growth and in-
terest expenses reduction. Finally, there is a 
negative impact of the higher solvency lev-
els on the ROE, which is achieved through-
out all tested channels of the capital regu-
lation impact, whereas the greatest effect is 
33
Management, Vol. 26, 2021, Special Issue, pp. 17-43
A. Kundid Novokmet, A. Pavić: CROATIAN BANKS PROFITABILITY UNDER CAPITAL ...
recorded for the operating efficiency chan-
nel of capital regulation. Thus, higher sol-
vency levels in the previous year will de-
crease bank ROE in the following year by 
increasing the credit risk, off-balance-sheet 
activity, as well as by enlarging the operat-
ing inefficiency. 
Overall, a more restrictive capital re-
quirements regulation will decrease the 
shareholders’ wealth, as well as damage the 
position of bank clients who will bear the 
burden of increased operating inefficiency, 
but it will improve overall bank profitability 
measured with the return on assets.
5. CONCLUSION
In the early stage of the capital require-
ments implementation, many attempts were 
made to discredit this regulatory concept. 
Therefore, for several years, the moral haz-
ard theory of capital regulation dominated 
academic literature in the field of bank-
ing and finance. The main premise of the 
aforementioned theory is that higher sol-
vency levels will have unintended effects 
on bank behavior, as under capital require-
ments pressures the bank profitability will 
start to melt down which might push the 
bank shareholders and managers towards 
accepting higher asset risks and outsourcing 
increased costs of financing and other regu-
latory costs on bank clients. That is why it 
was assumed that banks will maintain their 
regulatory capital on the lowest permitted 
levels. However, it turned out that banks 
voluntarily keep sizeable capital buffers 
i.e. the surplus of capital above the regula-
tory requirements, and a new explanation of 
such behavior appeared in the form of the 
capital buffer theory. With regards to the 
latter one, banks voluntarily keep capital 
buffers, so that they would have the abil-
ity for further asset growth and/or asset 
riskiness increase. Thus, higher capital buff-
ers might consequently lead to even higher 
overall bank profitability. Having in mind 
all of those controversies as well as the ex-
istence of the empirical gap for the Croatian 
banking sector, we have performed an ex-
tensive analysis of the capital requirements 
impact on various components of bank 
profitability.
Our main findings support the assump-
tion that capital requirements regulation 
might have a heterogeneous impact on bank 
shareholders and stakeholders. It turned out 
that higher solvency levels increase over-
all bank profitability measured with the 
return on assets as well as the net interest 
margin, which is a primary source of bank 
profitability in the traditional (commercial) 
banking model. On the other hand, share-
holders’ wealth approximated with the re-
turn on equity diminishes with the higher 
solvency levels. Furthermore, the burden of 
capital requirements also lands on bank cli-
ents (approximated with the net interest in-
come) from whom a higher interest income 
could be charged and collected and/or lower 
deposit interest rate offered. However, if 
banks would manage their overheads in a 
more cost-efficient way, regulatory costs 
could be internalized, and not outsourced 
to bank clients. Finally, bank managers 
will increase asset riskiness and off-balance 
sheet business as a consequence of higher 
solvency levels and achieve higher overall 
profitability measured with the return on as-
sets. This should not be perceived as impru-
dent behavior, as banks create their capital 
buffers with the final goal of using them to 
support the growth and approval of loans 
with higher risk weights. 
Overall, the key message of this paper 
is that there is a trade-off between share-
holders’ profitability and banking stability, 
while the burden of regulatory costs is often 
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borne by bank clients, instead of being in-
ternalized with a more cost-efficient busi-
ness of banking. Thus, the main conclusion 
of this research is that operating efficiency 
needs to be increased in the Croatian bank-
ing sector to avoid negative side-effects of 
capital requirements regulation on bank 
clients. However, more research in the area 
of banking cost efficiency as well as in the 
field of other implications of capital re-
quirements regulation needs to be done to 
reach less general policy recommendations 
from the bank managers as well as pruden-
tial authorities’ point of view.
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PROFITABILNOST HRVATSKIH BANAKA U 
UVJETIMA OTEŽANIH KAPITALNIH ZAHTJEVA
Sažetak
Reguliranje ponašanja banaka korištenjem 
kapitalnih zahtjeva ključna je točka bonitetne re-
gulative od kraja 1980-ih godina. Međutim, ko-
risnost njenih efekata za sigurnost i pouzdanost 
bankarskog sektora se osporava još od njihove 
inicijalne primjene, uglavnom zbog pretpostavki o 
negativnom utjecaju na bankovnu profitabilnost i 
povećanju vjerojatnosti da će bankovni menadže-
ri biti skloniji riziku, posebno na visoko konku-
rentnim financijskim tržištima. S druge strane, na 
profitabilnost banaka djeluju brojni čimbenici, 
osim onih, koji se odnose na udovoljavanje za-
htjevima regulacije kapitala. S obzirom na nave-
deni problem, u ovom se radu postavlja pitanje o 
utjecaju kapitalnih zahtjeva na profitabilnost ba-
naka. Korištenjem dinamičke panel analize istra-
žuju se posljedice regulacije bankovnog kapitala 
na profitabilnost hrvatskog bankarskog sektora, 
uzevši u obzir podatke iz 24 komercijalne banke, 
u vremenskog razdoblju od 2011 do 2016. Utjecaj 
regulacije kapitala na povrat na ukupnu imovinu 
i neto kamatnu maržu je bio pozitivan, dok je za 
povrat na vlasničku glavnicu utvrđena negativna 
veza. Zaključuje se da banke prebacuju troškove 
regulacije na svoje klijente, što se može aproksi-
mirati neto kamatnom maržom. Nadalje, rezultati 
pokazuju da se ukupna profitabilnost banke po-
stiže na trošak dioničara te se predlaže troškovno 
učinkovitiji pristup upravljanja bankama.
Ključne riječi: kapitalni zahtjevi, profita-
bilnost banke, kapitalna struktura, komercijalne 
banke, dinamička panel analiza
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